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FAQ#8: Was there a Master Plan to use the Olympic Games to 
Promote a Positive Image of China to the World ? 
February 1, 2009 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | 3 comments 
(And What was the Strategy for Dealing with the International Criticism on Human 
Rights)? 
(This is a shortened version of a paper presented at the conference on ““The 2008 
Beijing Olympic Games: Public Diplomacy Triumph or Public Relations Spectacle?” 
organized by the Center on Public Diplomacy, US-China Institute, and Center for 
International Studies at the University of Southern California, January 29-30, 2009.) 
There was a common perception outside China that the Beijing Olympic Games 
involved a master plan to promote a positive image of China to the outside world and 
that this was one of the major goals of hosting the Olympic Games, if not the major 
goal. I want to argue that while there was widespread agreement in China that the 
Olympics were an excellent opportunity to promote an image of China to the world, the 
vast majority of the attention and effort was focused on the domestic audience; that 
there was never a concrete communication strategy for dealing with the human rights 
issue; and that in both instances, China’s ability to communicate a positive international 
image was hindered by the domestic political structure. 
The People’s Olympics 
Many Western journalists and Amnesty International accused China of failing to keep its promises with respect to its 
human rights record. But China had not made any such promises, and if journalists had read chapter five of my 
recent book, Beijing’s Games, they would have known that there was a big internal debate about even the one 
sentence about human rights that was made in China’s bid presentation in 2001. 
However, in its bid China did make one promise that it arguably kept, and that was its promise to host a “people’s 
Olympics.” There were three main themes for the Olympic Games: the High-tech Olympics, the Green Olympics, and 
the renwen (人 文 奥 运 ) Olympics. Renwen is difficult to translate. It was sometimes translated as the “humanistic 
Olympics,” but after some debate, the preferred official translation was the “People’s Olympics.” This theme was 
originally intended as a response to the West’s criticism ofChina’s human rights, but this was never made explicit to 
the West. 
One of the central concepts of the People’s Olympics was 以人为本 , “take people as the root,” or “people-
orientation.” This phrase had appeared in political rhetoric when Hu Jintao named it in his address to the Third 
Plenum of the 16th Party Congress in 2003. This preceded the inclusion of a passage on human rights in the revision 
to the Constitution in 2004. It is interesting that as early as 2001, 以人为本 had already been written into the guiding 
thought for the Beijing Olympic Games. 
In 2000, Beijing Mayor Liu Qi began commissioning a number of groups with the task of 
developing the basic thought behind the 人 文 奥 运 because he felt that, unlike the 
other themes, it was unclear. The People’s University formed the Humanistic Olympic 
Studies Centre to study it. One of the non-Communist Parties, the Democratic League, 
was commissioned by Liu Qi and began developing working papers in 2001. Forums 
were held, dissertations and books were written on the topic, working papers were 
drafted, websites were created, and by the start of the Games it was estimated that at 
least ten thousand pages had been written on the topic of the “People’s Olympics.” 
Faculty members of the Beijing Sport University and the Humanistic Olympic Studies 
Center of the People’s University were particularly involved with the relevant sport, 
educational, and cultural organs of the central and Beijing government. Although they 
had travelled abroad, these intellectuals were all largely focused on the domestic 
audience and not the international audience. They gave dozens if not hundreds of 
interviews to Chinese media, appeared frequently on CCTV, and were influential in 
shaping domestic media opinion. They seldom gave interviews to foreign media and on 
occasions when they did they were belittled as Party-liners (see these characterizations 
of Beijing Sport University’s Ren Haiand People’s University’s Jin Yuanpu). 
As a result of the orientation of the intellectuals who designed it, the guiding thought of 
the People’s Olympics was largely diverted away from any focus on China’s 
international image and into a debate over culture and education. In my interactions with 
BOCOG and the intellectuals who were working with it, I felt that about 80-90% of the 
effort that went into this symbol-making was directed toward the domestic audience. 
The main focus was on the questions of how to manage the “combination of Eastern 
and Western cultures” （东西结合）that the Games were supposed to facilitate, how to 
promote Chinese culture within China and to the world, how to use the enthusiasm for 
the games to raise the general quality (素质) and civility (文明) of the Chinese people, 
how to prepare the next generation of young Chinese to take their place in the 
international community. 
These discussions and debates formed the intellectual context for Zhang Yimou’s 
opening and closing ceremonies, the Olympic education programs in the schools that 
reached as many as 400 million Chinese schoolchildren, the training programs for the 
70,000 Olympic volunteers, the cultural performances in the Cultural Olympiad, and the 
myriad of other cultural and educational activities that surrounded the Games. 
Perhaps the major way in which the guiding thought about the promotion of China’s 
national image was generated was through three keypoint research projects 
commissioned by theNational Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science, which 
is administered by the Central Propaganda Department. These grants are the 
government’s way of channeling academic research in directions that serve its needs. 
The relative unimportance of the Beijing Olympic Games is indicated by the fact that 
from 2003 to 2008, only five related projects were funded, of which three were 
“keypoint” projects with a competitive application process. By way of comparison, in the 
same time period the number of funded projects that fell under the rubric of “Marxist-
Leninist Services” was 190, and under “Party History and Construction” was 178. The 
first relevant Olympic project was the 2003 project entitled “Improving China’s 
International Position and Reputation through the 2008 Olympic Games.” 
The Beijing Sport University won the bid for this project and in April 2007 published the 
results in Research on Improving China’s International Position and Reputation through 
the 2008 Olympic Games (《２００８年奥运会提升中国国际地位和声望的研究》). Its 
65 chapters contain thorough summaries of the issues that provoked negative media 
reports in past Olympic Games, such as delays in venue completion, transportation 
problems, media information glitches, terrorist acts, and so on. The lesson 
that Beijing clearly learned was that these particular problems should be avoided at all 
costs, and ultimately they avoided all the problems that got negative media coverage in 
previous Olympics. The analyses of Western media coverage of the Beijing Games 
since 2001 indicated that “political” issues – as they are called in China – would 
dominate coverage. However, the resulting recommendations merely emphasize the 
importance of treating the media and other leading opinion-makers well. 
The most daring chapter, “Beijing Olympics Speed Up the Transformation of the 
Functioning of the Government,” analyzes the promises made under the rubric of the 
“People’s Olympics” – and improving human rights is not listed as one of them. 
A second keypoint project of the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social 
Science was the 2006 project “Construction of the Humanistic Concept, Social Value 
and National Image of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games” (《2008年北京奥运会的人文理
念、社会价值与国家文化形象构建》), which was awarded to the People’s University. 
Through this project and elsewhere, the People’s University promoted its concept of the 
“Cultural Olympics.” The final report has not been completed, but in a summary of their 
conclusions on CCTV in February 2008, they argued that research shows that culture 
constitutes the core of national image, and “therefore in the construction of a national 
image, we should hold the line on ‘Cultural China’ （坚持走“文化中国”的路线）in 
order to make the idea of ‘Cultural China’ into the core theme for dialogue between 
China and the international community in Olympic discourse.” 
So my first point is that if the “People’s Olympics” was the response to the West’s 
human rights accusations, then that response was delivered in the form of culture and 
symbols – the “look and image” of the Games, the “branding” of China, the display of 
“Chinese culture” – and not in the form of verbal debate or dialogue. They were very 
successful in the former, but the absence of the latter led critics to characterize the 
Games as one big show orchestrated by the Party-state. This simple-minded view does 
not do justice to the passion with which the producers of the People’s Olympics threw 
themselves into fulfilling their mission of promoting Chinese culture and achieving its 
integration with Western culture. I believe we should accord them more respect. 
If the People’s Olympics was to be the response to Western criticism of China’s human 
rights record, then it probably needed to directly address the issue of human rights, but 
the topic was never directly taken on in the reports and research devoted to the topic. 
But now we run into the structure of domestic control over discussions of human rights. 
The sports scholars, philosophers, and members of non-communist parties who were 
developing these documents were not likely to address such a sensitive topic as human 
rights because it was not their job. The job of communicating China’s position on human 
rights to the outside world one is one of the official responsibilities of the State Council 
Information Office, which is simultaneously the Office of Foreign Propaganda of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party. This organ’s function is to act as the media 
conduit between China and the outside world. The Information Office is under the Party 
Central Committee’s Propaganda Department, which is the nerve center of China’s 
thought control system. But the factionalism between the various “systems” （系统）of 
the Chinese government is well-known, and the propaganda system is a different 
system from the sport, cultural, and educational systems involved in creating and 
implementing the People’s Olympics; its power base is in media and communications 
circles. I did not see evidence that it had an active role in conceptualizing the People’s 
Olympics. 
National Image 
While the other systems were doing their work, the Information Office was involved in a 
separate effort, which involved a different group of intellectuals in the field of 
communications, whose core was located at the Communications University of China. 
The question of China’s national image had been the subject of a fair amount of 
intellectual work, though not nearly as much as the multidisciplinary effort behind the 
“People’s Olympics.” The third relevant keypoint project designated by the National 
Planning Office for Philosophy and Social Science was the 2005 project, “The Design of 
China’s National Image in Communications with the Outside World (对外传播中的国家
形象设计),” which was awarded to the Foreign Communications Research Center (对外
传播研究中心), a unit administered by the Foreign Languages Publishing Bureau, which 
is in turn under the Party Central Committee. The major results of this project, which 
involved scholars in communications atChina’s top universities, were published in April 
of 2008 (Communication of a National Image, 《国家形象传播》). Among the 60 
chapters, there is not one on the Beijing Olympics. The chapters that touch upon the 
Olympics agree that Olympic Games are an excellent opportunity to promote a national 
image; but they use the examples of the Tokyo 1964 and Seoul 1988 Olympic Games 
as models for a promoting a positive image, and they do not offer the possibility that the 
Games can promote a negative image. And so three years of work by China’s top 
communications intellectuals failed to produce a strategy for dealing with attacks and 
criticism. 
Olympic China National Image Ad 
If there had been a master plan for using the Olympics to promote China’s image, it 
would have been developed by the Central Propaganda Department. The single person 
most responsible for coordinating everything would have been Li Dongsheng, who was 
simultaneously a member of the Party Central Committee, Vice Minister of the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, and – more to the point here – Deputy 
Director of the Central Propaganda Department, chief of BOCOG’s Media and 
Communications Coordination Group, and president of the China Advertising 
Association. Western media tended to make a big deal out of the American (Hill and 
Knowlton) and British (Weber Shandwick) PR firms that had worked for BOCOG, but in 
fact the non-Chinese viewpoint that they provided to BOCOG was only one among 
many collected, and probably not the most influential – and in any case, BOCOG was 
not empowered to discuss “political” issues. 
So the major reason that there was no master PR plan was due to the strict division of 
labor with regard to communications with the outside world, with only the organs under 
the Central Propaganda Department empowered to speak about “political” issues. While 
the sport, educational, and cultural systems were crafting their “cultural” messages, the 
Information Office was engaged in a completely independent effort to produce a 
television commercial for “China” at the end of 2007. The difficult eight-month birthing 
process of the “Olympic China National Image Ad” indicates that if Li Dongsheng were 
trying to develop more proactive communications with the outside world, he may have 
had his opponents. The ad had been approved at the start of 2007, but it was not finally 
pushed through until just before the end of the fiscal year. Pressure was exerted via a 
long article entitled “Raise China’s Face – Where is China’s National Image Ad?” （《扬
起中国脸—中国国家形象广告在哪里》）which appeared in November 2007 in Modern 
Advertising Magazine, a publication of the China Advertising Association of which Li 
was president. The article was written with the help of scholars at the Communication 
University of China and demonstrated the widespread support of the heads of China’s 
major advertising firms. One section, “Using theOpportunity of the Olympics to Build a 
National Image,” reviews the risk of negative media coverage but, like the other 
publications discussed, it does not develop a communication strategy for responding to 
it. 
I was invited to be on the panel of academics that evaluated the bid presentations by 
eight of the top advertising agencies with offices in China. After leaving the hotel where 
we were sequestered, I never heard anything further about the project until the ad was 
shown on CNN and BBC on August 8, the day of the opening ceremony. I have still not 
seen it. Its release had been delayed from the original planned date of April because of 
the torch relay protests and the Sichuan earthquake disaster. Local reports on the 
internet make it seem that the project was not finally awarded to one of the advertising 
firms, but instead to a production team formed by the Information Office. It was also 
apparently cut to 30 seconds from the originally planned 90. 
At the time, we were told that we were making history, because for the first 
time China was reaching out to the world to try to shape its image, rather than waiting 
for the world to come and understand it. Those involved in the process seemed to feel 
that it was an extremely important first step. In December 2007 the Information Office 
already expressed to me that it knew it was not effective in communicating a positive 
image of China to the world. It evidently felt it needed a new strategy for dealing with the 
human rights issue because in December 2008, it announced that together with the 
Foreign Ministry it was spearheadingChina’s first-ever “Action Plan on Human 
Rights,” which would be prepared for release in January by a panel including 50 
institutions and NGOs. That this effort was spearheaded by the Information Office and 
Foreign Ministry, and not by the ministries and offices that actually control human rights, 
has led Western critics to describe it as a public relations ploy. However, another way of 
looking at it is that because they are the interface with the outside world, these organs 
are probably better versed on human rights debates than any others inChina. Also, the 
Information Office’s close connection with the Central Propaganda Department is 
necessary in dealing with a very important ideological issue. The Chinese 
announcement states that it will not be just another white paper on human rights, but an 
actual action plan with benchmarks. A more optimistic interpretation of this measure 
might be that China’s international image is now being enlisted in a strategy to name 
and shame the other state organs into closer adherence to international human rights 
standards. I believe that the momentum for the action plan was strengthened by the 
difficult experiences surrounding the Beijing Olympics. 
Tags: The 2008 Beijing Olympics 
 
